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Abstract
Information exchange in policy networks is usually attributed to
preference similarity, inuence reputation, social trust and institu-
tional actor roles. We suggest that political opportunity structures
and transaction costs play another crucial role and estimate a rich
statistical network model on tie formation in the German toxic chemi-
cals policy domain. The results indicate that the eect of preference
similarity is absorbed by other determinants while opportunity struc-
tures indeed have to be taken into account. We also nd that dierent
types of information exchange operate in complementary, but not nec-
essarily congruent, ways.
1 Motivation
The question how policy networks operate has provoked a substantial number
of policy network studies over the course of the last 30 years (Leifeld, 2007).
Some of the more recent analyses have tried to assess the reasons why polit-
ical actors establish contacts to some actors but not to others. Particularly
ideology (Henry et al., 2010; Laumann et al., 1992), preference similarity on
political issues (Weible and Sabatier, 2005; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998; K onig
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1and Br auninger, 1998; Carpenter et al., 2004), preference dissimilarity (Stok-
man and Zeggelink, 1996; Stokman and Berveling, 1998), functional or insti-
tutional interdependence (Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998; K onig and Br auninger,
1998), social trust (Carpenter et al., 2004; Henry et al., 2010) and perceived
inuence (Weible and Sabatier, 2005; Stokman and Zeggelink, 1996; Stokman
and Berveling, 1998) have been found to be drivers of tie formation in policy
networks. These ndings have been obtained by conducting quantitative case
studies of several policy domains or subsystems like San Francisco Bay-Delta
water policy (Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998), California marine protected area
policy (Weible and Sabatier, 2005), the U.S. health policy and energy policy
sectors (Carpenter et al., 2004; Laumann et al., 1992), U.S. agricultural pol-
icy and labor policy (Laumann et al., 1992), and the German labor policy
domain (K onig and Br auninger, 1998).
In contrast to some of these studies, we argue that preference similar-
ity does not predict tie formation suciently well. Instead, we posit that
opportunity structures as proposed by Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987) in the
context of individual (non-elite) discussion networks exert a strong inuence
on the communication between actors. We derive this hypothesis from re-
source dependence theory, mobilization theory of social movements, and the
transaction cost approach. Establishing contacts is apparently not trivial, so
actors have to rely on institutionalized venues like policy-related committees,
and make use of already existing channels of communication.
Moreover, tie formation is qualied by the type of information exchange
under scrutiny. This point has been neglected by other studies conducted
so far. Scientic or technical information exchange, on the one hand, and
political or strategic information exchange, on the other hand, may serve
quite dierent purposes. Exchange on technical matters is important since
many policy problems are growing increasingly complex and technical. As
Heclo (1978, 103) observed back in 1978, \knowing what is right becomes
crucial, and since no one knows that for sure, going through the process of
dealing with those who are judged knowledgeable [...] becomes even more
crucial." We would thus expect scientic actors to be much more attractive
contacts for organizations in the technical information exchange network.
We examine these points by analyzing political and technical information
exchange in the policy domain of toxic chemicals regulation in Germany in
the 1980s. Previous work on this policy network by the authors (Schnei-
der, 1988; Schneider and Leifeld, 2009) has revealed that actors who occupy
central positions in the information exchange network also maintain policy
positions closer to the nal policy outcome. This correlation suggests that
embeddedness in the information exchange network may be advantageous for
organized interests. In the light of this policy-relevant nding, it is interest-
2ing to know what drives centrality in the communication network, or more
broadly, what determines whether two organizations actually exchange in-
formation or not. In doing so, we combine several hypotheses from relevant
literature (see above) and add our own hypotheses regarding opportunity
structures and the role of scientic expertise on top of that. The primary
goal is to nd a model that explains network formation suciently well. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the rst time that all of the presumably
relevant hypotheses are included in a single model and that dyadic depen-
dence is explicitly taken into account. Our secondary goal is to estimate the
relative contribution of each of the hypothesized factors.
Our paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we review the literature on
tie formation in policy networks and derive testable hypotheses and control
variables. Section 3 introduces the policy domain under scrutiny, the data
collection process, our variables, and the methodology of exponential random
graph models that we employ. In section 4, we will present the results of our
analysis and discuss the model t. The nal section 5 puts the results into
perspective and suggests further theoretical and empirical pathways.
2 Explaining information exchange
State-centric approaches to policy-making assume that public policies are
designed and implemented by governmental actors like the parliament and
administrative agencies. The policy network approach, in contrast, assumes
that public policy-making and implementation are also aected by a vari-
ety of societal or political actors like interest groups, scientic organizations,
political parties, or international organizations (Adam and Kriesi, 2007).
Public and private actors can maintain various empirically measurable rela-
tions like information or resource exchange, inuence attribution, or common
group membership. These structures are usually stable for several years;
the analysis focuses on fairly persistent governance arrangements in a cer-
tain policy sector, or \2nd order economizing" in the words of Williamson
(2000, 597). The relation of most interest in the literature on policy networks
has been information exchange, which has sometimes been called \contact-
making" (Carpenter et al., 2004) or \policy network formation" (K onig and
Br auninger, 1998).
2.1 Preference similarity
There are two competing views on whether preference similarity between
political elite organizations has a positive or a negative eect on the proba-
3bility of communication between them. In one of these perspectives, political
actors seek alliances with like-minded actors.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Weible, 2007) pro-
vides an example. Roughly speaking, it posits that there are two or more
coalitions in any policy subsystem which continuously try to convince each
other of the optimal design of a policy. Policy core preferences are the \glue
that binds coalitions together", i.e., policy-related beliefs are more similar
within coalitions than they are across coalitions (Sabatier and Weible, 2007,
195). Accordingly, coordinated behavior is hypothesized to be much more
prevalent within coalitions than between actors of dierent coalitions in the
Advocacy Coalition Framework. Along these lines, empirical research has
shown that \both belief congruence and functional interdependence are im-
portant for understanding coordination" (Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998, 473)
and that \shared beliefs are the best predictor for policy network relation-
ships" (Weible and Sabatier, 2005, 461).
The nding is corroborated by Carpenter et al. (2004), who examine
the role of directed triads as well as preference similarity in contact-making
networks between Washington lobbyists in the health sector and the energy
sector. They conclude that \whether in health politics or energy politics,
and whether the sample includes all organizations in a policy arena or just
private organizations, preference similarity is an important determinant of
information transmission in national politics" (Carpenter et al., 2004, 243).
This result is interpreted in the light of signaling models between lobbyists
and legislators, which predict \that information is transmitted credibly to
the extent that the sender and receiver share policy preferences", and in the
light of the mobilization of bias theory. According to the latter, \providing
information subsidizes the receiver's activities, enabling her to become active
in an issue at lower cost; groups strategically provide information to those
with similar interests" (Carpenter et al., 2004, 226).
K onig and Br auninger (1998) develop an explanatory model of informa-
tion exchange between organized corporate actors in the German labor policy
domain. Their results conrm the impact of the \distance between actors'
preferences" on the \likelihood of network choice" (K onig and Br auninger,
1998, 464). Two theoretical reasons are cited: rst, since information is an
\important power resource", actors are more inclined to inform their allies
than their opponents. This is perfectly in line with the prediction of the Ad-
vocacy Coalition Framework that coordination takes place inside coalitions,
but not between them. Second, K onig and Br auninger (1998, 448) propose
that preference similarity actually works via an intermediary variable, namely
opportunity structures: like-minded actors meet each other frequently, and
this promotes communication between them. In this article, we can test
4this claim more rigorously because we have recorded information about the
preferences of actors and their membership in policy committees separately.
At the level of individual voters, analogous results have been obtained.
Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987, 1213) conclude that \individuals do purpose-
fully attempt to construct informational networks corresponding to their
own political preferences." Unlike at the organizational level, the nding
is explained by dissonance theory rather than power resources and coalition-
building. Psychological factors are presumably more important at the indi-
vidual level if compared with organizations.
So far, both theoretical as well as empirical work has emphasized that
shared preferences lead to information exchange because coordination on
policy-related matters usually takes place between political allies. However,
there is also a contrary view on preferences: in their policy maximization
model, Stokman and Zeggelink (1996) and Stokman and Berveling (1998)
simulate policy networks under the assumption that actors initiate contacts
with other actors if they have opposite preferences. In their view, \actors
can inuence each other's policy positions (preferences) only through access
relations. Access relations are therefore instrumental to obtain policy out-
comes as close as possible to the own preferences" (Stokman and Zeggelink,
1996, 80). Consequently, if described as a spatial game, establishing contacts
with similar actors in terms of preferences has no eect, and contact-making
with actors who have more extreme positions in the same direction from the
status quo is even counter-productive. Only access to other actors who have
preferences beyond the status quo or between their ideal position and the
status quo are ecient (Stokman and Zeggelink, 1996, 93).
For the same reasons, Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) assume in their
competitive lobbying model that a lobbyist tends to inform a legislator of
the appropriate policy design if the legislator has dissimilar preferences (c.f.
Carpenter et al., 2004, 226, footnote 3).
The latter two models stress that actors have an incentive to convince
their opponents by sending policy-related information to them. In this case,
preference similarity should have a negative eect on network tie probability
between actors. This runs counter to the empirical ndings of the policy
network literature presented before.1 How can these seemingly contrary hy-
potheses be reconciled?
1There is a third theoretical possibility: actors may initially have no opinion and may be
convinced by other actors. Having no opinion, however, requires that an actor's interests
are not at stake. In our conceptualization, how much an actor's interests are at stake is
rather a separate dimension of policy-making. Hence we reserve this question for future
research.
5We posit that the two views prevalent in the literature rest on two entirely
dierent types of communication between political actors. In the rst case,
the contents of institutional communication is political or strategic informa-
tion which is used by actors to coordinate their activities. Shared strategies
can be conceived of as a power resource. The second type of communication
is rather technical or scientic information about how the policy at issue
could be designed. This type of information is more neutral and contains
knowledge about the causes and consequences of a complex problem, pol-
icy goal priorities, and technical policy advice, often generated by scientic
organizations in the rst place and sent to interest groups or governmental
actors. These ideal types correspond to the dierent types of policy advice
described by Pielke (2007, 14), who distinguishes between the actor roles
of an \issue advocate", who pursues policy goals, and an \honest broker",
who is committed to objective truth. Both types of information are on a
continuum, but we assume that it is possible to distinguish between them by
employing standardized questions, albeit with some \noise".
The distinction between the two types of information makes the policy
maximization hypothesis compatible with the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work, where technical policy analyses are used to justify one's own policy
beliefs and to convince adversarial coalitions of the optimal policy choice
(Sabatier, 1987). We can thus formulate two distinct hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: The power resource model
The more similar the preferences of two actors, the more likely
they are to exchange political/strategic information.
Hypothesis 1b: The policy maximization model
The more similar the preferences of two actors, the less likely they
are to exchange scientic/technical information.
2.2 Technical and scientic expertise
This leads to the question of government access. Conventional lobbying mod-
els assume that lobbying is asymmetric, meaning that interest groups exert
an inuence on decision-makers. In the model of Austen-Smith and Wright
(1992), interest groups send information to governmental actors. In other
theories of interest intermediation, organized interests try to exert pressure
on the government (for an overview, see van Waarden, 1992). K onig and
Br auninger (1998) show empirically that disproportionally many informa-
tion channels exist to public decision-makers. They explain their nding by
citing neo-institutionalist arguments: \Public decision-makers take the nal
6vote on public policies which are of interest to other actors with no formal
voting power, and, thus, the latter will most likely try to get access to these
public decision-makers" (K onig and Br auninger, 1998, 449). Similarly, Car-
penter et al. (2004, 232) \control for whether the [...] receiver [...] is a
Governmental actor, since inuential political actors are more likely to be
contacted." However, they can conrm their hypothesis only in the energy
sector, but not in health politics.
Considering the dierent types of information, we posit that technical
information is frequently sent to governmental actors { in the narrow sense,
e.g., federal ministries and administrative agencies { because this is consis-
tent with the neo-institutionalist policy maximization model set out above.
Interest groups are thereby likely to submit scientic information to the gov-
ernment in order to increase the chance that their views and opinions are
codied into law. At the same time, decision-makers actively acquire techni-
cal knowledge from scientic actors and think tanks in order to increase the
quality of their decisions or simply to obtain justication of their decisions
(Sabatier, 1987, 650). On the other hand, the same transmission channel is
used for the exchange of political and strategic information. Interest groups
exchange such information with their allies and with those whom they seek
to align with, all else being equal.
Hypothesis 2a: Governmental access
Governmental actors have disproportionately many incoming in-
formation ties both in the scientic/technical and in the politi-
cal/strategic information exchange network.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, scientic actors generate knowl-
edge and distribute it to other actors. Governmental actors are particularly
inclined to receive specialized knowledge because they seek to make justied
decisions. But scientic organizations are not constrained to submit their
results to decision-makers. They rather have an interest in distributing their
\product" to anyone who is interested, including international organizations,
parties and interest groups. We therefore hypothesize that scientic actors
maintain many outgoing information ties in the scientic information ex-
change network. This should not be the case when it comes to political and
strategic information.
Hypothesis 2b: The role of scientic actors
Scientic actors are particularly likely to send scientic/technical
information to other actors, but they are not particularly likely to
send political/strategic information.
72.3 Opportunity structures
Besides collecting hypotheses from other empirical studies and putting them
in a theoretical context, we also seek to make a genuinely new contribution
to the theory of political communication among policy elites, which has not
been tested before in an empirical analysis. The argument we would like to
put forth is concerned with political opportunity structures.
As noted earlier on, in their interpretation of preference similarity, K onig
and Br auninger (1998) argue that common preferences are actually channeled
via opportunity structures. If two actors have similar prefererences, they are
more likely to meet each other frequently. And if they have the chance to
exchange information at regular meetings, they will take this opportunity to
team up with potential allies.
We argue that preference similarity and opportunity structures are two
separable mechanisms, which contribute independently to network formation.
Both variables may covary to a certain degree, but regular participation in
meetings is rather an expression of an actor's interest in inuencing policy-
making, on the one hand, and its ability to participate in institutionalized
policy committees, on the other. The idea is inspired by social movement
research and mobilization theory, which alleges that political opportunity
structures facilitate the ability of social movements to mobilize collectively
(Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 1995). Political opportunity structures \are com-
prised of specic congurations of resources, institutional arrangements and
historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the develop-
ment of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others"
(Kitschelt, 1986, 58).
We dene opportunity structures more narrowly as the ability of actors
to communicate with each other without incurring transaction costs. If this
is the case, actors should be more likely to exchange information than if
information exchange is costly in terms of time, money or other resources.
The argument is obviously borrowed from new institutional economics or
more specically from transaction cost theory, and particularly from the
observation that institutionalized forms of exchange can be more ecient
due to lower transaction costs in the long run (Williamson, 1991). This
view is reected by associational theories of interest intermediation like neo-
corporatism. Policy-making in institutionalized committees is regarded as
a distinct form of governance beside communities, hierarchies and markets
(Streeck and Schmitter, 1985).
Moreover, these hypotheses are compatible with resource dependence the-
ory, which states that organizations have to establish contacts to other actors
to maintain their survival in a world of scarce resources (Pfeer and Salan-
8cik, 1978). The fewer resources they need to sacrice in order to establish
such a dependence relationship, the higher is the overall payo of the actor
to establish the link. Along the lines of mobilization theory, transaction cost
theory, interest intermediation theories and resource dependence theory, we
propose our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a: Policy committees
The more common policy committees two actors take part in, the
more likely they are to exchange (both political/strategic and tech-
nical/scientic) information.
The reduction of transaction costs by using political opportunity struc-
tures can, however, occur via multiple channels. Opportunity structures are
not necessarily institutionalized. A second test of the opportunity structure
hypothesis can be easily achieved when taking into account that two dier-
ent types of information exist and can be exchanged by actors. If actor A
sends scientic information to actor B anyhow, there are virtually no costs
associated with sending further information, such as strategic advice, and
vice-versa.
Hypothesis 3b: Other communication channels
If an actor sends political/strategic information to another actor,
it is more likely also to send technical/scientic information to
the other actor, and vice versa.
2.4 Control variables
There are several secondary hypotheses, most of which have been tested
empirically before. We will include them as control variables in order to
estimate a model of information exchange that is as complete as possible
and that does not suer from omitted variable bias.
Interest group homophily
The power resources model implies that interest groups are especially likely
to share political or strategic information with other interest groups. We
can expect this pattern because information exchange serves to coordinate
activities in the pursuit of a common goal. Such a goal is nowhere else
as pronounced as in lobbying groups because their very motivation is to
change (or retain) the status quo. In other words, interest groups are more
likely than other actors to seek alliances, both as a sender and receiver of
strategic information, because their payo from cooperating with others is
9higher. At the same time, interest groups are particularly attractive allies
because their intrinsic motivation to attain policy goals is higher than the
intrinsic motivation of other actors like, for example, scientic organizations.
This results in mutual attachment between interest groups (in network terms
\homophily", c.f. McPherson et al., 2001).
The policy maximization model makes the same prediction, but it results
from a completely dierent mechanism: interest groups seek to convince
their enemies, so they send them technical information about the appropriate
policy design. Quite obviously, other interest groups are { if decision-makers
are controlled for { the primary target of technical information because they
are at the core of the adversarial coalition (Sabatier and Weible, 2007).
More generally speaking, in both models, interest groups have incentives
to exchange information with each other because this is their institutional
role. We therefore include a control variable for the homophily of interest
groups, stating that interest groups are particularly likely to send (both sci-
entic/technical and political/strategic) information to other interest groups.
Perceived inuence
Besides the policy maximization model cited above, Stokman and Zeggelink
(1996) also developed a competing model called the control maximization
model. It is based on the assumption that actors seek access relations to
other actors whom they perceive as powerful. They \estimate their likelihood
of success by comparing their own resources with those of the target actors"
(Stokman and Berveling, 1998, 582). When confronting this model with
empirical data, however, Stokman and Berveling (1998, 595) nd limited
evidence: \The CM model clearly performs worse [than the policy maximi-
zation model]. This was found in other studies as well."
Quite to the opposite, Weible and Sabatier (2005) nd a moderate eect
of inuence attribution on policy coordination and advice-seeking even when
holding preference similarity constant. Their study on California Marine
Protected Area Policy reveals that \in technical, complex policy subsystems
with inuential organizational aliations that control resources, actors have
to get some advice/information and coordinate somewhat with inuential af-
liations { irrespective of beliefs" (Weible and Sabatier, 2005, 471). This in-
terpretation follows resource dependence theory (Pfeer and Salancik, 1978),
which states that organizations have to establish contacts to well-resourced
organizations to maintain their survival in a world of scarce resources. Ap-
plied to politics, actors seek alliances with actors who are in control of formal
decision-making power or informal, but extensive, access to relevant decision-
makers.
10To link inuence reputation back to the discussion of preference similarity
and strategies of actors, the empirical result \would indicate that stakehold-
ers are interacting to some extent with other actors of divergent beliefs"
(Weible and Sabatier, 2005, 471). At least to a certain extent this would
challenge the basic assumption of the Advocacy Coalition Framework that
coordination takes place within coalitions. Our models hence include a con-
trol variable for the perceived inuence of potential peer organizations.
Inuence of third parties on information exchange
Network ties are rarely independent from each other. If A is connected to
B and C, then this may also aect the likelihood of B being connected to
C. Modeling the dependencies is in fact the primary goal of statistical social
network analysis; the autocorrelation resulting from those dependencies is not
just an obstacle to be ruled out. Having this framework in mind, Carpenter
et al. (2004) explicitly analyze the role of third-party connections for dyadic
relationships. More precisely, they test a number of triad congurations and
nd that transitivity is a particularly relevant element of contact-making,
meaning that actor A is more likely to interact with actor B if A interacts
with a third party C who also interacts with B. In network terminology,
directed two-paths between two actors have an eect on their tie probability.
Carpenter et al. interpret this kind of transitivity as \social trust" and
\social capital": actors need common \friends" to reduce uncertainty about
the quality of their contact. As Carpenter et al. (2004, 230) put it,
\groups are constantly searching for good sources of information.
That is, interest groups are not simply transmitting information
about politics and policy, but also about who are reliable sources
of information. Presumably, most interest groups consider their
sources of information to be reliable (otherwise, why get infor-
mation from them?) and report this to other groups with whom
they communicate. There is thus a dynamic tendency to create
transitive relationships: A communicates to B, which is satised
with the information it gets from A, and reports this to C, which
subsequently seeks information from A."
This kind of social behavior is typical when actors exchange strategic informa-
tion about policy goal attainment and related topics. We therefore include
a transitivity-related control variable which checks whether the number of
directed two-paths between two actors in the political/strategic information
exchange network positively aects their likelihood of establishing a direct
tie.
11Similarly, the Advocacy Coalition Framework hypothesizes that organi-
zations show coordinated behavior and that coordination and learning from
each other take place within coalitions (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Thus,
actors are more likely to trust information from another organization if it
is in the same coalition. Common neighborhood clearly matters. The same
argument is put forth by Carpenter et al. (2004, 227): \When an issue is
both complex and newly emergent, [...] policy actors will engage in discus-
sion in order to establish a frame of reference within which preferences may
be dened. [...] To the extent that policy communication is this sort of
mutual construction of issue interpretations, social properties such as friend-
ship, trust, sharing common frames of reference, and other social similarities
will increase the likelihood of communication."
Such a view presupposes that transitivity not only matters when consider-
ing strategic communication; it expands to technical or scientic information
as well because actors use such information to construct a coalition and its
corresponding frame of reference. However, this is at odds with the policy
maximization model cited earlier on (Stokman and Zeggelink, 1996), which
implies that technical information is sent to adversarial coalitions, rather
than being distributed within the actor's own coalition. Consequently, clus-
tering and thus triad formation and transitivity should be signicantly less
marked than in the strategic information exchange network.
We therefore keep in mind that this is a challenged view when formulating
our next control variable according to the Advocacy Coalition Framework
and the reference frame construction hypothesis of Carpenter et al. (2004):
we check whether the number of directed two-paths between two actors in
the technical/scientic information exchange network positively aects their
likelihood of establishing a direct tie.
3 Data collection and methodology
The previous section has provided a literature review of theoretical and em-
pirical studies contributing to the analysis of information exchange between
policy elites. We have compiled a list of hypotheses from previous works and
also generated genuinely new hypotheses by linking several theories from
other elds. These hypotheses shall be tested with a dataset on toxic chem-
icals regulation in Germany in the 1980s collected by one of the authors
(Schneider, 1988). This section will introduce the case of toxic chemicals
policy-making and describe the data collection process.
123.1 The toxic chemicals problem
After World War II, the production of chemicals increased to an unprece-
dented level. Approximately 100,000 dierent chemical substances were
traded on the global market. Many of these chemicals were evidently ex-
tremely dangerous for human health and the environment, sometimes in the
form of insidious diseases or after long-term contact. At the beginning of
the 1970s, most industrialized countries adopted the view that a passive
treatment of these toxic substances was no longer aordable. They initiated
chemicals control programs and testing procedures for chemical substances.
Forerunners of this trend were the Swiss toxic substances law (\Giftgesetz")
in 1969 and similar laws in Japan and Sweden in 1973.
In Germany, a legislative process was started mainly upon the initiative of
the OECD and the European Community at the end of the 1970s. The eort
culminated in the adoption of a law for the protection against dangerous
substances (ChemG) in 1980. However, this law was restricted to the control
of newly produced chemicals without considering toxic substances already on
the market. This restriction was intended by the chemical industry because
it feared fatal economic consequences if control obligations were extended
to existing chemicals. The chemical industry association (VCI) took a lead
position in this process because it possessed the representational monopoly
of economic and industrial interests in this policy domain, and these were
in turn major employers and investors on the global market. The chemical
industry was not only a growth sector; to a certain degree, it also promised a
future-proof development due to its structural closeness to genetic research,
biotechnology and related industrial branches.
3.2 Selection of actors
As the main point of reference of this system of policy actors was the chemi-
cals problem and its direct and indirect eects, it was possible to dene a set
of interested actors. As far as direct inuences in the life cycle of a chemical
are concerned, occupational safety, health and environmental interests were
potentially aected by the toxicity of the substances. Moreover, a set of
governmental actors was bound to react to the politicization of the problem
by these societal actors. It is therefore quite easy to derive the following
set of actors on theoretical and institutional grounds: the state, parties/the
parliament, organized interests (capital, labor, environment and consumers)
and nally actors from science and technology.
Methods from elite research were applied to conduct a proper speci-
cation of the boundaries of the network (c.f. Laumann et al., 1983). This
13task was not negligible because the results of a network analysis critically
depend on the valid and reliable selection of actors. The positional approach
served to compile a list of all possible organizations from institutional sec-
tors that were potentially aected by the problem of toxic chemicals. The
names of these organizations were collected from relevant handbooks about
public organizations and the list of lobbyists in the German parliament. At
the second stage of the selection procedure, press archives, lists of partici-
pants of relevant events, and protocols and documents of relevant agencies
and ministries were surveyed to conrm or discard the actual participation
of organizations, and some new actors were added. This second stage is
called the decision approach. The resulting list contained 90 organizations
that were asked to submit annual reports, position papers, press releases and
other relevant documents. On the basis of these documents and a number of
expert interviews, 39 organizations were selected and asked to ll out a stan-
dardized questionnaire in the winter of 1984/1985, following the approach of
Laumann and Knoke (1987) and Laumann and Pappi (1976). Eight more
actors were named by the interviewees. The response rate was 85% (40
out of the 47 actors). To obtain a complete inuence core from this actor
set, only those 30 actors were retained who were cited as being inuential
by at least one of the other actors. This nal list of actors is composed of
eleven governmental actors (among them six federal ministries), three par-
ties, seven organized interest groups, six scientic/research organizations and
three international organizations. Further details about the actors and the
data collection process are provided by Schneider (1988).
The set of 30 actors is somewhat smaller than the datasets used in some
of the other articles. However, the careful data collection procedure ensures
a high quality of the data in terms of reliability and validity. Since the two
networks to be modeled are directed and we concentrate on edges as the unit
of analysis, there are n2   n = 870 observations which are partly dependent
on each other, so the real number of observations might be smaller than 870.
3.3 Measurement and variables
The two network relations of interest are political/strategic and scienti-
c/technical information exchange. The political/strategic information ex-
change network was collected by setting the following task:2
2The original questionnaire was in German. The questions have been translated for
this article.
14\Please list the names of all organizations with whom you reg-
ularly exchange information about aairs related to chemicals
control."
This network does not contain information about who sends information to
whom, but it is still directed because actors indicate whom they perceive to
be information exchange partners. The technical/scientic information ex-
change network was collected by asking respondents the following questions:
\In the decision process on the chemicals law, scientic and tech-
nical information were of central importance.
a) From which of the organizations mentioned on the list does
your organization usually obtain scientic and technical in-
formation?
b) To which of the organizations does your organization deliver
such information?"
These two separate pieces of information about sending and receiving tech-
nical/scientic information were combined in a single network matrix T by
multiplying the entries of the sender matrix S with the entries of the trans-
pose of the receiver matrix R (i.e., the Hadamard product). The result is a
conrmed network:
T := S  R
T (1)
Preference similarity was measured by identifying six core policy topics
relevant in the decision process: self-regulation, the scope of the reform, the
control procedure, the timing of the control mechanism, intensity of control,
and the treatment of chemicals already being traded on the market (please
refer to the original study for more details). For all actors, agreement or dis-
agreement with each issue was coded either as +1 (agreement), 0 (neutrality),
or  1 (disagreement). The resulting variables i:::n were used to construct
a dissimilarity matrix by calculating the Euclidean distance d between each
pair of actors p and q:
d(p;q) =
v u u t
n X
i=1
(pi   qi)2 (2)
The dissimilarity matrix was converted into a similarity matrix by subtract-
ing each dissimilarity value from the maximum dissimilarity value:
s(p;q) = max(d)   d(p;q) (3)
15The resulting matrix of preference similarities between actors can be inter-
preted as an undirected, weighted network, which can subsequently be used
as an edge covariate in a statistical network model.
Perceived inuence was collected as a binary, directed network matrix
with the row actor indicating what column actors it perceived as inuential.
Membership in policy committees was collected from the various documents
surveyed during the selection process and recorded as binary attribute vari-
ables in a data matrix M. A square co-occurrence matrix C was generated,
indicating which pairs of actors attended how many committees together:
C := M  M
T (4)
3.4 Methodology and model specication
The purpose of this article is two-fold: on the one hand, a statistical network
model will be employed to test the hypotheses set out in section 2. On
the other hand, the goal is to model the information exchange behavior
of political actors as adequately as possible, so we are eventually able to
reproduce the tie formation process using simulations.
As mentioned earlier on, networks show complex dependencies between
ties, resulting in matrix autocorrelation. In other words, the error terms in
a simple OLS regression would be correlated across observations, standard
errors would be too small and p values too optimistic. There are two so-
lutions to avoid this problem: one is to correct for the autocorrelation by
employing the quadratic assignment procedure (Krackhardt, 1988), and the
other solution is to model the dependencies directly as a social network. We
take the latter approach and draw on the family of exponential random graph
models (ERGM), or p* models, described by Robins et al. (2007a,b) and im-
plemented in the statnet package (Handcock et al., 2003) for the statistical
computing environment R (R Development Core Team, 2009). The general
form of exponential random graphs can be written as








with y representing a tie in the network Y,  being a normalizing constant,
gA(y) representing the model terms listed in table 1 (A is the index of the
model terms), and A being the coecients of the model terms. In order
to model our two information exchange networks Y1 and Y2, we estimate a
dyadic dependence model with the model terms listed in table 1.
The model is tted via Markov Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood
Estimation (MCMC MLE). The estimated coecients can be interpreted
16L(y) a term containing the number of edges in the graph, P
i<j yij
PS(y) an undirected, weighted edge covariate representing
preference similarity as calculated by equation 3
H1
IFgov(y) a statistic representing ties where the target is a govern-
mental actor
H2a
OFsci(y) a statistic representing ties where the source is a scien-
tic actor
H2b
C(y) an undirected, weighted edge covariate representing the
number of common committee memberships as dened
in equation 4
H3a
O(y) a directed, binary edge covariate representing the other
communication type not represented by Y (scienti-
c/technical or political/strategic communication)
H3b
Uig(y) a nodal attribute mixing statistic representing ties where
both the source and the target are interest groups
C1
IA(y) a directed, binary edge covariate representing inuence
attribution
C2
v(y;1) GWESP, the geometrically weighted edge-wise shared
partner statistic with parameter 1; see Hunter (2007)
for details; we use a rather low value of 1 = 0:1 to avoid
model degeneracy
C3a
w(y;2) GWDSP, the geometrically weighted dyad-wise shared
partner statistic with parameter 2 = 0:1
C3b
Table 1: Model terms and their aliated hypotheses or control variables
like in a logit regression model. The dependent variable is the log odds of
establishing a network tie. Coecients are interpreted as log-odds ratios
conditional on the rest of the network.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Results of the analysis
Table 2 shows the estimation results for four models. The rst two are
models of political/strategic information exchange, and the last two of tech-
nical/scientic information exchange. The edge term L(y) is comparable































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18are limited to estimating the eect of preference similarity on information
exchange.
In the case of political/strategic information, tie formation is indeed pos-
itively associated with preference similarity, while there is no association
whatsoever in the case of technical/scientic information, but the sign of
the coecient at least meets the prediction of hypothesis 1b. The former
observation is in accordance with the policy maximization model and the
Advocacy Coalition Framework, which posit that strategic information is
exchanged primarily among allies. The fact that there is no eect in the
second case indicates that the association between preferences and technical
information exchange might be somewhat more complex than the policy max-
imization model and the Advocacy Coalition Framework assume. Technical
information are not merely used to inuence the opponent; they are also used
to construct a common frame of reference, as Carpenter et al. (2004) have
pointed out. However, if we take any other explanatory factor into account,
the positive eect of model 1 disappears. Preference similarity is absorbed
by other factors, which are captured by models 2 and 4. Hypothesis 1a can
therefore only partly be conrmed, and hypothesis 1b is not supported.
As for the nodal attribute hypotheses 2a and 2b, governmental actors
are clearly the addressees of both scientic/technical and political/strategic
information. This eect is slightly more pronounced in the political network,
which is probably due to the fact that for interest groups, governmental actors
are slightly more interesting as allies than as lobbying targets. However, both
relations are strongly aected. As expected, scientic actors are a major
source of scientic/technical information while their political or strategic
output is not particularly high (but not particularly low either; otherwise
the coecient would be negative and signicant).
Opportunity structures are strong predictors of tie formation with all four
coecients being highly signicant and positive (hypotheses 3a and 3b). Ac-
tors who belong to the same policy committees are more likely to exchange
both types of information, presumably because their transaction costs are
low. If two organizations exchange one type of information, they are also
much more likely to exchange the other kind of information as well because
the transmission channels exist anyway. This is in line with resource depen-
dence theory and social movement mobilization theory (c.f. section 2.3).
The nodal mixing control variable 1 has positively signicant coecients.
In both networks, interest groups are more likely than chance to exchange in-
formation among each other. This nding is compatible with the Advocacy
Coalition Framework as interest groups are the core actors in each coali-
tion because their interests are at stake. Whether positive signals (alliance-
seeking) or negative signals (inuencing each other), organized interests are
19particularly likely to clump together, a nding that is also supported by some
theories of interest intermediation, like neo-corporatism.
Inuence attribution plays a major role in choosing interaction partners.
The positive and strongly signicant coecients conrm the predictions of
Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) and the control maximization model of
Stokman and Berveling (1998) { although the authors actually nd little
support for their model. We can thus corroborate the nding of Weible
and Sabatier (2005) that perceived inuence positively aects peer choice, a
nding which also supports the prediction of resource dependence theory that
organizations strive for inuential contacts to maintain their survival. The
Advocacy Coalition Framework assumes that coordination takes place within
coalitions; however, this assumption must be qualied by taking inuence
into account.
Finally, transitivity eects of third parties can be clearly demonstrated
as well. The geometrically weighted edge-wise shared partner distribution
(GWESP) and the geometrically weighted dyad-wise shared partner distri-
bution (GWDSP) can be interpreted together (Hunter, 2007). The GWESP
statistic essentially captures whether those actors who are tied are more likely
than pure chance to have multiple transitive shared partners. GWDSP cap-
tures the propensity of any dyad (whether connected or unconnected) to
have multiple transitive shared partners, which is sort of a baseline eect of
shared partners in the network. GWESP is interpreted on top of that once
dyad-wise shared partners have been controlled for. GWESP and GWDSP
have a geometric character, i.e., the number of shared partners per dyad
is weighted by 1 = 2 = 0:1. This rather low parameter value puts more
emphasis on dyads with few shared partners: dyads with one shared partner
are not particularly likely to have a second shared partner, and so on.
The GWESP statistic is positive and highly signicant in both networks,
indicating that social trust and social capital eects are at work. Connected
dyads are indeed likely to have approximately one or two transitive shared
partners. GWDSP is signicant and negative, i.e., there are generally fewer
unconnected dyads with shared partners than predicted by chance. Tran-
sitivity eects are not only expected by social capital theory, but can also
be derived from the Advocacy Coalition Framework: actors self-organize in
coalitions, so there are many transitive shared partners. In contrast, the
policy maximization model of Stokman and Berveling (1998) would have ex-
pected contact-seeking between opponents, so there should be no transitive
shared-partner eect in the technical information exchange network. Our ev-
idence suggests that the policy maximization model is wrong in this respect.
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Figure 1: Goodness of t of the political information exchange model (upper
row) and the technical information exchange network (lower row)
4.2 Goodness-of-t assessment
As stated at the outset of this article, our primary goal is to nd an appro-
priate model of information exchange. Obviously, this should entail assessing
the goodness of t of our model by simulating new networks from our coe-
cients. Simulating 100 networks from each of the two complete models shows
that the simulated networks are indistinguishable from the original networks
by eyeballing them. To support this claim, gure 1 plots three well-known
network statistics of the original network (the thick black line) and the 100
21simulated networks (the box plots): indegree, minimum geodesic distance,
and edge-wise shared partners (see Hunter et al., 2008, for details).
The indegree distribution of the original political network takes a zig-
zag curve which can be hardly caught by a parametric model. However,
the model is not terribly o the mark. Only indegrees of ve, which seem
to be quite common in the network, are strongly underrepresented by the
model. Nevertheless, adding a network statistic for indegrees of ve would
certainly mean overtting the model because there is no guidance in the
literature why actors should have ve incoming ties, even more so given
the much lower frequencies of its neighboring indegrees four and six. The
indegree distribution of the technical network exhibits similar variation, but
the simulated distributions seem to represent the original network quite well if
we consider the overall picture. The other two statistics, minimum geodesic
distance and edge-wise shared partners, perform extremely well, with the
case of zero edge-wise shared partners being slightly overrepresented by the
second model.
Overall, the estimated models t the data very well and seem to capture
most of the variation. All three simulated graph statistics predict the orig-
inal networks with high accuracy. This is a noteworthy nding because we
seem to have incorporated all of the relevant factors contributing to network
formation. Such an undertaking is especially dicult in policy-related appli-
cations because many layers of complexity are added by dierent rationales
of actors, institutional roles and constraints, voters, media discourses, etc.
5 Conclusion
First and foremost, our analysis has revealed the eect of opportunity struc-
tures on tie formation in policy networks. We have operationalized the eect
by counting co-membership in policy committees and by estimating the im-
pact of complementary types of information exchange relations. To the best
of our knowledge, this eect has not previously been demonstrated empiri-
cally. According to our interpretation, political organizations take transac-
tion costs into account when considering whom to approach. When actors
choose potential interaction partners because they are important in attaining
policy-related goals, they also consider if these potential exchange partners
are easy to reach. Our nding suggests that politics is not merely power-
driven, but also resource-dependent. This bears some interesting policy im-
plications: if the state is interested in balancing organized interests in order
not to be captured (this alludes to pressure pluralism versus the capture the-
ory; c.f. van Waarden, 1992), it may want to promote civil society groups
22that cannot aord to take part in the inner circle of sectoral politics. Oth-
erwise one coalition might become more inuential in the political process
because its members are well connected, and this coalition might bias polit-
ical outcomes into their desired direction. This is precisely what happened
in the case of German toxic chemicals regulation in the early 1980s (c.f.
Schneider, 1988, for details). This normative approach is not new; it is well-
known under the label sponsored pluralism (c.f. van Waarden, 1992). Please
note, however, that subsidizing organized interests selectively to keep up the
balance may have negative welfare implications as well. Economic scrutiny
may show whether political gains of a balanced interest group population
outweigh eciency losses due to the subsidies. This is beyond the scope of
this article.
Secondly, we have assembled a rather rich model of policy network for-
mation by recycling bits and pieces of previous policy network studies and
related literature and combining them with variables measuring opportunity
structures of political actors. The model ts the data very well, and we are
condent that we have contributed to the advancement of the literature on
policy networks by providing a baseline model for potential replications in
other policy sectors or other contexts. After all, any policy network study
can only be a case study, and other policy networks might operate quite
dierently due to other institutional contexts, so this is certainly a worth-
while endeavor. Technological advances like the rise of personal computers
and internet communication may nowadays aect the way political organiza-
tions interact, rendering the necessity of reducing transaction costs via policy
committees or other factors meaningless.
Thirdly, we have suggested that there is not one single way how a policy
network operates. To the contrary, the exchange of technical information
diers from strategic information in some respects. Previous studies on \tie
formation in policy networks" tended to ignore this possibility, and infor-
mation exchange was treated as a homogeneous phenomenon. Nonetheless,
the main eects are consistent across the two relations; only institutional
roles and preference similarity show dierent patterns. Reviewing the rele-
vant theoretical literature has, in spite of this, suggested that the two types
of relations partly dier in their rationales, but not in their consequences
for tie formation patterns. For instance, technical information is often ex-
changed with allies because they try to establish a common frame of refer-
ence (a cooperative relation). At the same time, technical information is also
exchanged with opponents, but this time in order to alter their views on opti-
mal policy design (a conictual relation). Thus the overall eect of preference
(dis)similarity cannot be discerned simply by measuring technical informa-
tion exchange, and the eect cannot be separated from strategic information
23exchange. We therefore propose that future policy network analyses should
take these strategic uses of information into account when collecting data on
information exchange between organizations.
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